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MOVING PAST HIPPIES AND HARASSMENT:  
A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO SEX, 
APPEARANCE, AND THE WORKPLACE 
ERICA WILLIAMSON 
Knowledge of history frees us to be contemporary. 
–Lynn White, Jr.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Darlene Jespersen tended bar at Harrah’s Reno casino for nearly 
twenty years and received excellent reviews by both her managers 
and her customers.2 Harrah’s terminated Jespersen in 2000 when she 
refused to agree to the company’s new “Personal Best” program, 
which among other things required all female but no male beverage 
servers to wear makeup.3 Jespersen filed suit under Title VII.4 The 
Ninth Circuit upheld summary judgment in favor of Harrah’s, 
rejecting Jespersen’s argument that the “‘Personal Best’ policy 
discriminated against women by (1) subjecting them to terms and 
conditions of employment to which men [were] not similarly 
subjected, and (2) requiring that women conform to sex-based 
stereotypes as a term and condition of employment.”5 The Jespersen 
litigation continues to receive attention in the legal and nonlegal 
 
Copyright © 2006 by Erica Williamson. 
 1. Lynn White, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Scholarship: History, 32 J. HIGHER EDUC. 
357, 361 (1961). 
 2. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated and 
reh’g en banc granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 3. Id. at 1078. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108 (internal quotation omitted). 
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press6 and to generate renewed interest among legal scholars7 and 
practitioners8 on the issue of sex and appearance in the workplace. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination 
in the workplace on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national 
origin.9 Many courts initially excluded grooming and appearance 
standards from Title VII protection.10 Some later courts included such 
standards but subjected them to a different analysis than other forms 
 
 6. See Carol Kleiman, Judges Embrace Mandatory Makeup, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 2005, at 
C2 (“[R]ecently, female employees suffered a grooming rules setback in the 9th U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Reno, when a three-judge panel ruled that women can be required to wear 
makeup.”); Nation in Brief, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2006, at A2 (“A casino company’s 
requirement for female bartenders to wear makeup does not amount to sexual discrimination, a 
federal appeals court ruled.”); Henry Weinstein, The Nation; Court Rules Bartender Was Justly 
Fired for Refusing to Wear Make-up; An Appeals Panel Decides the Grooming Policy of 
Harrah’s Casino Asking Servers To Be ‘Appealing to the Eye’ Is Not Gender Bias, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 29, 2004, at A18 (“Harrah’s casino in Reno had the right to fire a female bartender because 
she refused to wear makeup despite the fact that she had consistently high employment 
evaluations, a sharply divided panel of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Tuesday.”). 
 7. See Devon Carbado et al., The Jespersen Story: Makeup and Women at Work, in 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 105 (Joel W. Friedman ed., 2006) (noting that in light 
of Jespersen, “[this] narrative illustrates how employers have used makeup as a technology to 
screen women into and out of the workplace”); Devon B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, 
Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240, 259 (2004) (“There is no good reason that bartenders 
who are women should have to present themselves as girly.”); Serafina Raskin, Sex-Based 
Discrimination in the American Workforce: Title VII and the Prohibition Against Gender 
Stereotyping, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 247, 254–62 (2006) (“By continuing to be deferential 
to company policies mandating sexual discrimination, courts undermine Title VII’s prohibitions 
on sex based discrimination.” (footnote omitted)); Megan Kelly, Note, Making-Up Conditions 
of Employment: The Unequal Burdens Test as a Flawed Mode of Analysis in Jespersen v. 
Harrah’s Operating Co., 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 45, 66–67 (2006) (“The Ninth Circuit’s 
unequal burdens test does not advance the goals of Title VII; instead, it permits discrimination 
through policies based on sex stereotyping.”); Recent Case, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2429, 2429 
(2005) (“[R]ecently, in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
undermined federal antidiscrimination principles by holding that female employees can 
sometimes be required to wear makeup as a condition of employment.” (footnote omitted)). 
 8. See Michael W. Fox, Piercings, Makeup, and Appearance: The Changing Face of 
Discrimination Law, 69 TEX. B.J. 564, 567–68 (2006) (“Somewhat surprisingly, the panel 
decision was affirmed (again over dissent) when the case was heard en banc.”); Patrick H. Hicks 
et al., Special Feature: Ninth Circuit Upholds Makeup Requirement, 14 NEV. LAW., June 2006, at 
28, 28–29 (2006) (authored by the attorneys representing Harrah’s in the Jespersen litigation and 
noting, “The seven-four majority opinion affirmed the right of employers in the Ninth Circuit to 
enforce reasonable dress and grooming standards in the workplace”). 
 9. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
 10. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(“[H]air length is not constitutionally or statutorily protected, and hence its regulation as to men 
but not women . . . is not sexual discrimination.”). 
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of sexual discrimination.11 Recent courts have struggled with the 
interaction between grooming and appearance standards and the use 
of sexual stereotypes as evidence of sex discrimination.12 The 
Supreme Court has yet to explicitly address sexually disparate 
grooming codes,13 and circuit courts of appeal and federal district 
courts must rely on forty years of unclear precedents that take a 
number of different approaches to the issue. As a result, decisions are 
inconsistent and modern employers and employees are uncertain of 
their rights and responsibilities. 
In response to the confusion, scholars have begun to suggest 
frameworks for resolving sex and appearance disputes in the 
workplace that do not rely on Title VII or notions of discrimination at 
all.14 Despite the novel work being done by these scholars, courts 
continue to decide cases addressing sex and appearance in the 
workplace using a Title VII framework.15 In order for the Title VII 
framework to be successful, courts must adopt a consistent, 
doctrinally clear approach to its use. This approach cannot be 
developed until courts and scholars understand the cases with which 
they are currently working. 
 
 11. For instance, the mutability and fundamental rights distinction, see infra Part I.B, and 
the equal burdens test, see infra Part I.C, are not often used outside the grooming context. 
 12. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1111–13 (en banc) (discussing 
the use of sexual stereotyping as evidence of sex discrimination). 
 13. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989), appearance and dress were 
among the factors leading the defendant to deny the plaintiff a partnership at the firm; however, 
the Court has never heard a case in which the plaintiff specifically alleges that a grooming policy 
is discriminatory. Further, at least one court has stated that the holding in Price Waterhouse 
does not imply that sex-based grooming standards violate Title VII. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. 
Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 14. Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining 
Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111 (2006); Gowri 
Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, 
Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2006), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=872324. 
 15. See, e.g., Wiseley v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., 94 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 402, 403–10 
(D.N.J. 2004) (summarily dismissing a male room service waiter’s claim that his employer’s 
short hair policy violated Title VII on the basis of the equity approach—a claim that the policy 
was not “evenhanded,” creating “no similar requirements for women” (citation omitted)); 
Barrett v. Am. Med. Response, N.W., Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1162–67 (D. Or. 2001) 
(summarily dismissing a male ambulatory services worker’s allegation that his employer’s “no 
beard” requirement violated Title VII on the basis of the equity approach); Kleinsorge v. 
Eyeland Corp., 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1601, 1601–02 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (summarily 
dismissing a male optometrist’s claim that his employer’s “no earring” requirement for male 
employees violated Title VII on the basis of the equity approach). 
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The current Title VII sexual discrimination literature addresses 
employee appearance cases in two ways. One group of scholars 
chooses not to address grooming and appearance as a distinct 
problem. They instead discuss employee appearance cases as 
examples of trait,16 sex-plus,17 or more general discrimination.18 This 
method obscures the unique issues that arise from the relationship 
between grooming, appearance, and sexual identity.19 The other 
group of scholars addresses the grooming cases thematically or en 
masse without emphasizing their chronology.20 Addressing the cases 
in this way runs the risk of focusing too heavily on the predominance 
of employer friendly outcomes at the expense of examining in detail 
the different analyses that produced these outcomes. 
Unlike prior scholarship, this Note seeks to understand sex-
based grooming challenges under Title VII21 by examining them in 
 
 16. Trait discrimination refers to an employer’s unwillingness to hire an individual because 
he or she possesses a physical or character trait like having a tattoo or being aggressive. 
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against 
Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 170 (2004). 
 17. Sex-plus discrimination is “the classification of employees on the basis of sex plus one 
other ostensibly neutral characteristic.” Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 
1089 (5th Cir. 1975). For example, an employer who refuses to hire overweight women but who 
hires overweight men is discriminating on the basis of sex plus weight. 
 18. See Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination 
Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769 (1987) (discussing grooming cases interchangeably 
with other forms of discrimination based on mutability); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating 
Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995) (discussing the grooming cases in the context of 
discrimination and gender nonconformity); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of 
American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing the grooming cases in 
relation to ordinances that prohibit discrimination on the basis of personal appearance); 
Yuracko, supra note 16 (discussing the grooming cases as a type of trait discrimination); 
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex 
Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147 (2004) (discussing grooming in the context of explaining 
the bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”)). 
 19. See infra Part III.A. 
 20. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance 
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541 (1994) 
(discussing the grooming cases without focusing heavily on their history or chronology); Karl E. 
Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395 (1992) 
(same); Mary Whisner, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 73 (1982) (same). Peter Zieglar does discuss the grooming cases with regard to 
history, chronology, and distinctiveness, but he only had access to the first few cases. Peter F. 
Zieglar, Note, Employer Dress and Appearance Codes and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 965 (1973). 
 21. This Note defines a grooming challenge under Title VII as a case brought in federal 
court challenging a particular grooming practice which results in a written decision. This Note 
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their chronological context, distinct from other areas of sexual 
discrimination jurisprudence. Such a chronological examination 
reveals four discrete approaches to grooming and appearance within 
the existing precedent. This Note explains the reasoning that 
underlies each approach and how the approaches evolved historically. 
Further, it identifies three conflicting goals for Title VII present 
within the four existing approaches and reveals that each approach 
emphasizes different interests. Each approach has strengths and 
weaknesses, and courts have not successfully and consistently applied 
any one approach. This Note contends that the current practice of 
intermingling precedent across time periods, goals, and emphases is 
unworkable. 
Any future approach to grooming and appearance under Title 
VII must have one clearly articulated goal and a mechanism for 
identifying, quantifying, and balancing the interests of both 
employees and employers. This Note seeks to use the lessons of past 
approaches to determine what that goal and mechanism should be. 
Further, it identifies two lines of cases, the haircut cases and the 
sexual minority cases, that are often misused in the area of grooming 
and appearance and seeks to clarify their appropriate roles. Unlike 
the works of several current scholars,22 this Note does not claim to 
craft a comprehensive new framework for evaluating sex-based 
grooming claims. Instead, it seeks to provide an additional analytic 
tool in the development of such an approach. 
I.  THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SEX AND GROOMING 
LITIGATION 
This Note examines over thirty-five federal district and appellate 
court cases between 1971 and 2006 in which an employee alleged an 
adverse employment action under Title VII on the basis of a sex-
differentiated grooming policy. Courts seem to have adopted four 
primary approaches to address these types of claims: the per se 
approach (PSA), the employer friendly approach (EFA), the equity 
approach (EQA), and the Price Waterhouse stereotyping approach 
(PWSA). 
 
does not address state law claims or claims that may have been resolved prior to reaching a 
federal court. 
 22. See supra note 14. 
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A. The Reasoning and Evolution of the Per Se Approach 
Under the per se approach, sex-differentiated grooming policies 
are per se, or intrinsically, discriminatory and an employer must 
justify every one as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).23 
The PSA developed in the early 1970s from the opinions of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), before any sex-
differentiated grooming claims reached federal courts.24 Three district 
courts later adopted the PSA to strike down employer regulations 
prohibiting men but not women from having long hair.25 These 
opinions and cases are rarely cited in contemporary grooming 
litigation, but they have not been overruled and their analyses remain 
relevant. The PSA establishes a logical link between Title VII and 
grooming and appearance claims, giving plaintiffs a way to bring such 
claims under Title VII. Advocates of the PSA argue that grooming 
and appearance policies should be covered by the general prohibition 
of “sex discrimination” under Title VII and that employers should be 
allowed little latitude to use sex in such policies. 
Title VII states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail 
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .26 
PSA advocates point to documents within Title VII’s legislative 
history that support a definition of “discrimination” as “a distinction” 
or “a difference in treatment.”27 The EEOC and courts applying the 
 
 23. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 24. Addressing its first grooming challenge under Title VII, the EEOC held in 1970 that 
allowing men to wear casual attire while prohibiting women from wearing pants violated Title 
VII and constituted discrimination on the basis of sex. Zieglar, supra note 20, at 967 n.12. 
 25. See Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (dismissing 
the claims of four long-haired, part-time male college workers, holding that the employer’s hair 
length policy was a violation of Title VII but that hair length had not been the cause of their 
dismissals); Donahue v. Shoe Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (addressing the hair 
length claim of a male shoe salesman); Robert v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio 
1971) (granting relief to a male employee on a cereal processing line who was discharged 
because his hair no longer fit under a hat, the required headgear for men, and he was not 
allowed to wear a hairnet like his female coworkers). 
 26. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (emphases added). 
 27. Aros, 348 F. Supp. at 664–65 (referencing Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII of 
H.R. 7152, 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964)). 
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PSA reason that grooming standards are terms and conditions of 
employment under Title VII28 and that any distinction or difference in 
the way men and women are treated in the workplace is 
discrimination because of sex.29 They interpret “because of sex” to 
include distinctions based on characteristics that defy sexual 
stereotypes.30 
Grooming policies do not distinguish between all women and all 
men; they distinguish between women with a given characteristic and 
men with a given characteristic.31 This is commonly known as sex-plus 
discrimination.32 PSA advocates rely on two cases that prohibit sex-
plus discrimination.33 Each case holds that discrimination on the basis 
of sex plus any characteristic based on a sexual stereotype is 
discrimination because of sex.34 The notion that only women should 
have long hair may be considered such a stereotype.35 The employers 
in the three district court cases adopting the PSA did not discriminate 
against their male employees simply because they were men or 
because they had long hair; they discriminated against them because 
they were men with long hair. 
 
 28. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 71-1529, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 952, 954 (1971) 
(“We conclude that Respondent’s hair-length and other personal appearance standards are 
terms and conditions of employment within the meaning of Section 703(a) and that the 
Commission does have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the charge.”); see also Aros, 348 F. 
Supp. at 664 (agreeing with the EEOC). 
 29. See EEOC Decision No. 71-1529, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 954 (addressing the 
claim of a male employee who was denied employment for having shoulder length hair and 
stating that “the application of a hiring/retention standard to [one sex and not the other], is 
discrimination because of sex within the meaning of Title VII”). 
 30. See Aros, 348 F. Supp. at 665 (referring to the sex-plus language of Sprogis v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) and Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 
(1971)). 
 31. For example, an employer may hire women and men but refuse to hire women who 
wear pants while agreeing to hire men who do so. 
 32. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (defining sex-plus discrimination). 
 33. Aros, 348 F. Supp. at 665. 
 34. See Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1197–98 (holding that an employer cannot refuse employment 
opportunities to women but not men who are married based on the stereotype that married 
women often forgo work to take care of the home); Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (holding that an 
employer cannot refuse employment opportunities to women but not men with small children 
based on the stereotype that women are the primary care givers). 
 35. Aros, 348 F. Supp. at 665 (“Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” (quoting Sprogis, 444 
F.2d at 1198)); Roberts v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (N.D. Ohio 1971) 
(analogizing the protective law cases and articulating a distinction between rules made on “an 
individual basis” and rules made on “a generic stereotype basis”). 
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Under the PSA, employers must justify all sex- or sex-plus-based 
distinctions.36 PSA advocates believe that an employee’s desire and 
right to be free from discrimination outweigh an employer’s desire to 
run its business any way it chooses, and sex- or sex-plus-based 
distinctions may only be imposed when absolutely necessary. Title 
VII states, “[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to hire and employ employees . . . , on the basis of . . . 
sex . . . in those certain instances where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . .”37 A BFOQ is 
a qualification that an employee must have to do a particular job. For 
instance, an employer would be able to legally require that all 
applicants for the position of wet nurse be women because men 
cannot dispense breast milk.38 Customer preference is not a BFOQ.39 
Therefore, under the PSA, employers are not allowed to require men 
to wear short hair simply because customers prefer it.40 Employers 
would, however, be able to require all long-haired employees working 
with food to keep their hair in a net.41 Because the PSA requires every 
distinction to be justified, doctrinally litigation under the PSA should 
turn on which grooming and appearance codes are absolutely 
 
 36. See EEOC Decision No. 71-1529, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 952, 954 (1971) 
(holding that applying hiring or retention standards to one sex and not the other, without a 
showing of business necessity, is sex discrimination under Title VII). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000). 
 38. For a discussion of how the BFOQ has worked in other areas of sex discrimination, see 
generally Yuracko, supra note 18. 
 39. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii), (a)(2) (2006). But see Yuracko, supra note 18, at 149 
(distinguishing two areas in which sexual discrimination on the basis of customer preference has 
been allowed: privacy and sexual titillation). 
 40. However, Roberts seemed to imply that “dress and appearance regulations might be 
reasonable [BFOQs] in the context of public contact employees,” Zieglar, supra note 20, at 975, 
but because the Roberts court was not working within the traditional Title VII BFOQ 
framework the court’s opinions on the subject are of little value. The Roberts court relied on 
Eastern Greyhound Lines Division of Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. New York State Division of 
Human Rights, 265 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1970), which relies on an unrelated New York Human 
Rights Law, id. at 746–47, rather than available EEOC decisions and Title VII precedent. The 
court seems to be unsure of how to approach a Title VII claim. Analysis is further complicated 
because the claim is filed as a § 702 claim based on “classifying” rather than the more common § 
703 claim based on “terms and conditions of employment.” Roberts, 337 F. Supp. at 1057. 
 41. See Roberts, 337 F. Supp. at 1055 (allowing an employer to require headwear to protect 
against unsanitary hair in the production process but not allowing the employer to require men 
and women to wear different headwear). 
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necessary. In practice this has not been the case.42 Courts have 
struggled with how to apply the BFOQ concept to grooming 
standards. 
Those applying the PSA espouse broad definitions of sex and 
sex-plus discrimination that provide extensive protection to 
employees and use Title VII to eliminate virtually all sex-based 
distinctions in grooming and appearance. PSA advocates rely on the 
concept of BFOQ to protect the interests of employers, but courts 
applying the approach give no indication of what type of grooming 
and appearance policies might be worthy of protection. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that the PSA has gained little 
judicial traction. Even the Fifth Circuit, which originally articulated 
the approach in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 
ultimately reversed its holding en banc and adopted the more popular 
Employer Friendly Approach.43 No court since 1972 has utilized 
precedent adopting the PSA. 
B. The Reasoning and Evolution of the Employer Friendly Approach 
Under the employer friendly approach, sex-differentiated 
grooming regulations are not prohibited by Title VII because they do 
not discriminate on the basis of immutable characteristics or 
fundamental rights and therefore have a negligible impact on equal 
employment opportunities. The EFA developed subsequent to the 
PSA in the mid-1970s from claims primarily about male hair length.44 
The en banc decision in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph 
Publishing Co.45 is the most frequently cited case adopting the EFA. 
 
 42. In Donahue v. Shoe Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1972), the court never properly 
addressed the issue of whether short hair was a BFOQ for constant contact with the public 
because the defendant failed to plead the issue, but the court implied that hair length was not a 
BFOQ noting that “the EEOC has defined the exception very narrowly, excluding from it ‘the 
preferences of . . . clients or customers.’” Id. at 1359 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii), 
(a)(2)). The Aros court was no better at addressing BFOQs in detail but was careful not to 
prohibit employee dress and grooming codes in their entirety and to acknowledge the necessity 
and prudence of such codes for the health of the employees and for the employer’s “efficient 
operation of the enterprise.” Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 666 (C.D. 
Cal. 1972). 
 43. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), 
rev’g 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 44. Four federal courts of appeals cases taken together outline the EFA. Id.; Baker v. Cal. 
Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 
1973); Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 45. Willingham, 507 F.2d 1084. 
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In Willingham, a young white male with shoulder length hair applied 
for a position with a Macon, Georgia newspaper that would require 
him to interact with the public.46 Although he had prior experience 
and passed all the applicable tests, the newspaper did not hire him.47 
A recent pop festival near Macon had left many of the city’s citizens 
with a negative impression of long-haired youth, and the newspaper 
feared that Willingham would have a depressing effect on ad sales.48 
The Fifth Circuit ultimately agreed with the paper.49 Decisions 
adopting the EFA, like Willingham, reason that grooming and 
appearance should not be covered by Title VII’s prohibition against 
sex discrimination. Further, these decisions explain why the ability to 
pass sex-differentiated grooming codes is important to employers and 
why employees may not have a legally protected right to dress in any 
manner they choose in the workplace. 
According to EFA advocates, Congress passed Title VII to 
ensure equal employment opportunity for men and women and did 
not intend that every sex-based distinction in the workplace be 
removed in order to do so. Title VII was not intended to address 
grooming because sex-based grooming distinctions do not create 
employment advantages for one sex over another. Further, EFA 
advocates contend that courts should not defer to any interpretation 
of Title VII by the EEOC that is contrary to congressional intent. 
Courts adopting the EFA have analyzed the legislative history of 
Title VII surrounding the addition of sex as a protected category and 
found it “meager”50 and “inconclusive at best.”51 Therefore, these 
courts rely on Title VII’s plain language and existing Title VII 
precedent52 to conclude that Congress’s primary goal was “that 
women . . . be afforded job opportunities on an equal footing with 
men.”53 Under this interpretation the “emphasis rightly lies”54 on 
equal employment opportunity, not on the elimination of all 
distinctions as the PSA advocates. “[O]nly those classifications or 
 
 46. Id. at 1087. 
 47. Willingham, 482 F.2d at 536. 
 48. Id. at 536–37. 
 49. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092. 
 50. Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 51. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090. 
 52. See id. at 1091 (quoting multiple cases which state that the plain language of Title VII 
indicates that its goal was to provide equal access to the job market for men and women). 
 53. Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1120. 
 54. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091. 
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discriminations which afford significant employment opportunities to 
one sex in favor of the other” are objectionable.55 Seven federal courts 
of appeals adopted the EFA56 in the 1970s and determined that 
grooming standards were not such classifications but were instead a 
“questionable application” of Title VII, not to be undertaken without 
a “stronger Congressional mandate.”57 
EFA advocates placed special emphasis on an employer’s right 
to determine the dress code of its employees.58 The EFA decisions 
recognized the enormous impact employee grooming can have on 
businesses and viewed controlling it as a managerial responsibility,59 
like reducing theft loss or maximizing sales. Courts adopting the EFA 
struggled with the same concerns as modern-day courts about the 
ultimate result of forcing employers to eliminate dress code 
 
 55. Dodge v. Giant Food Co., 488 F.2d 1333, 1335 (D.D.C. 1973); see Fagan, 481 F.2d at 
1123 (“It was not planned that the Act was ‘[to] be used to interfere in the promulgation and 
enforcement of the general rules of employment, deemed essential by an employer, where the 
direct or indirect economic effect upon the employee was nominal or non-existent.’” (quoting 
Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235, 237–38 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (alteration in original)). 
 56. See Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (agreeing with the 
Willingham line of cases); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(adopting unanimous result of other circuits); Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 
1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (adopting Willingham line of cases); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249 
(8th Cir. 1975) (same); Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092 (“[D]istinctions . . . on the basis of 
something other than immutable or protected characteristics do not inhibit employment 
opportunity. . . . Congress sought only to give all persons equal access to the job market.”); 
Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896–98 (9th Cir. 1974) (reviewing and agreeing with 
the holding in Dodge and Fagan); Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1120–21 (establishing the initial reasoning 
behind the EFA). 
 57. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090. 
 58. See Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1124 (“This court, without a far more certain mandate from 
Congress than that contained in Title VII, will not be party to what it considers a ridiculous, 
unwarranted encroachment on a fundamental right of employers, i.e., the right to prescribe 
reasonable grooming standards which take cognizance of societal mores.” (quoting Willingham 
v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 352 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 (M.D. Ga. 1972))); id. at 1123 (“Congress by 
this Act did not give the federal courts the task of deciding whether hair at the collar level or 
one-half inch below is a bona fide occupational qualification. Such a suggestion is absurd; such a 
task borders on the non-justiciable.” (quoting Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 402, 
404 (D.D.C. 1972))). 
 59. Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1124–25 (“Perhaps no facet of business life is more important than a 
company’s place in public estimation. That the image created by its employees dealing with the 
public when on company assignment affects its relations is so well known that we may take 
judicial notice of an employer’s proper desire to achieve favorable acceptance. Good grooming 
regulations reflect a company’s policy in our highly competitive business environment. 
Reasonable requirements in furtherance of that policy are an aspect of managerial 
responsibility.”). 
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distinctions based on gender norms.60 These courts tried to give 
employers as much latitude as possible and only limit their rights 
when absolutely necessary61 to avoid creating unequal employment 
opportunities.62 
They determined that employer regulations only create unequal 
employment opportunities and seriously impose upon employees 
when they implicate immutable characteristics and fundamental 
rights. According to the Supreme Court, “[d]iscriminatory preference 
for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what 
Congress has proscribed.”63 Title VII specifically prescribes that 
employers not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or national 
origin, all of which are immutable characteristics. Courts adopting the 
EFA concluded that “logic dictates that sex is used in the same sense 
[as race, color, and national origin] rather than to indicate personal 
modes of dress or cosmetic effects.”64 Protecting employees from 
discrimination on the basis of immutable characteristics is consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s view that discrimination should not result 
from “forces beyond [the employees’] control.”65 
Prior cases addressing sex-plus discrimination, however, had 
struck down regulations based on mutable characteristics, such as 
marriage or motherhood.66 In order to reconcile these holdings67 and 
 
 60. See Willingham, 352 F. Supp. at 1020 (“It would be patently ridiculous to presume that 
Congress ever intended” employers to have to allow men to wear dresses, “lipstick, eyeshadow, 
earrings, and other items of typical female attire.”). 
 61. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092 (finding that “Congress sought only to give all persons 
equal access to the job market, not to limit an employer’s right to exercise his informed 
judgment as to how best to run his shop”). 
 62. See Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“Few would 
disagree that an employer’s blanket exclusion of women from certain positions constitutes 
‘discrimination’ within the meaning of Title VII. At the same time, few would argue that 
separate toilet facilities for men and women constitute Title VII ‘discrimination.’ The line must 
be drawn between these two extremes . . . .”). 
 63. Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1119 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). 
 64. Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 65. Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1125 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 
(1973) (alteration in original)). 
 66. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 615–16 (1971) (addressing 
prohibition against women with small children); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 
1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (addressing a no marriage rule for stewardesses). 
 67. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (reconciling the holdings 
in Phillips and Sprogis). 
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Title VII’s inclusion of religion,68 which is also mutable, the EFA 
courts concluded that Congress must have also intended Title VII to 
protect employees from discrimination on the basis of fundamental 
rights.69 They therefore ultimately held that in all circumstances not 
involving immutable characteristics or fundamental rights, which 
include most grooming regulations,70 the employer’s right to control 
its business outweighs the interests of its employees. Because job 
applicants have complete control over hairstyles and modes of dress, 
the EFA courts decided that discrimination on the basis of such 
characteristics does not stand in the way of equal employment 
opportunity and therefore is not proscribed by Title VII. 
Finally, EFA advocates rejected the EEOC’s understanding that 
sex-differentiated grooming standards are per se discriminatory.71 
They argued that the EEOC’s guidelines should only be given 
deference when “[Title VII] and its legislative history support the 
Commission’s construction.”72 Courts adopting the EFA held that 
“neither [Title VII] nor its legislative history even remotely 
predicated an instance of discrimination ‘because of sex’ on the length 
of an employee’s hair”73 and concluded that they were “not obliged to 
stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative 
 
 68. Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1125 n.22. 
 69. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091 (“[A] line must be drawn between distinctions 
grounded on such fundamental rights as the right to have children or to marry and those 
interfering with the manner in which an employer exercises his judgment as to the way to 
operate a business.”); Dodge v. Giant Food Co., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(distinguishing marriage from hair length by noting that “although neither marriage nor hair 
length is an unalterable personal characteristic, marriage has a much more fundamental 
importance to and effect upon an individual’s life”). 
 70. Several cases following the EFA noted the minimal effect of grooming regulations on 
employees. See Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (“The prohibition of 
sex discrimination must be interpreted in light of the purpose and intent of Congress in enacting 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Employer grooming codes requiring different hair lengths for men 
and women bear such a negligible relation to the purposes of Title VII that we cannot conclude 
they were a target of the Act.”); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(“[S]light differences in the appearance requirements for males and females have only a 
negligible effect on employment opportunities.”) In both cases there was a policy for both men 
and women, there was no evidence that the policies served as a pretext to exclude women from 
employment on the basis of sex, and there was no evidence that women who failed to comply 
with the policies were not also discharged. 
 71. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092 (relying on Fagan to rebut the argument that the 
court should defer to the understanding of the EEOC). 
 72. Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1125 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971)). 
 73. Id. 
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decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that 
frustrate the Congressional policy underlying a statute.”74 
Many scholarly articles cite the EFA, many circuits still follow it, 
and courts have used it within the last decade to strike down 
grooming challenges.75 Proponents of the EFA articulate a narrow 
goal for Title VII. They authorize employers to pass any sex-
differentiated grooming codes they choose, and they minimize the 
impact that such codes may have on employees. By the mid-1970s, 
numerous courts had addressed the issue of disparate grooming 
standards. Courts began deferring to the reasoning of their 
predecessors who had adopted the EFA and often offered little 
analysis of their own.76 Employers instituting grooming codes 
appeared to have the upper hand. Courts adopting the EFA, 
however, had already laid the ground work for an alternate approach 
to challenging such codes based on “unequal enforcement” or 
“unequal burdens.”77 
C. The Reasoning and Evolution of the Equity Approach 
Under the equity approach grooming standards are not 
prohibited by Title VII if they place equal burdens on male and 
female employees. The EQA developed in the late 1970s and 1980s 
out of the EFA notion that Title VII’s goal is equal employment 
opportunity and only those distinctions which prohibit such 
opportunity should be eliminated. The EQA relies heavily on EFA 
 
 74. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1988)). 
 75. See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(upholding hair length policy); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908–09 (2d Cir. 
1996) (same); Santee v. Windsor Court Hotel Ltd., No. 99-3891T, 2000 US Dist. LEXIS 15960, 
at *10 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2000) (upholding failure to hire due to employer’s perception of 
unnatural hair color); Capaldo v. Pan Am. Fed. Credit Union, No. 86CV1944, 1987 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14475, at *6–7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1987) (upholding no-earring requirement). 
 76. See, e.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977) (relying 
solely on the reasoning of other circuits that had considered the question previously); Longo v. 
Carlisle De Coppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Without necessarily adopting all of 
the reasoning of those opinions, we are content to abide by this unanimous result.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Fountain, 555 F.2d at 756 (plaintiff arguing that “even if separate dress and 
grooming regulations do not offend Title VII, unequal enforcement of these regulations does 
violate the statute”); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that 
slight differences in the appearance requirements for males and females are acceptable under 
Title VII when they are “imposed in an evenhanded manner”); Willingham v. Macon Tel. 
Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that if “both sexes are being screened 
with respect to a neutral fact, i.e., grooming in accordance with generally accepted community 
standards of dress and appearance,” each sex is treated equally). 
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cases, but it has a distinct analysis. The first major victory under the 
EQA came in 1979 in Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings and Loan,78 
which relied on three flight attendant cases to articulate a new 
approach.79 In Carroll, the Seventh Circuit overturned a regulation 
that required female but not male bank officers, tellers, and 
managerial employees to wear coordinated uniforms.80 In addition to 
requiring its female employees to wear the uniforms, the bank 
withheld income tax on the basis of their cost and required the 
employees to pay for the cost of their cleaning and maintenance.81 
The EQA begins with a distinction based on sex. In Carroll “two 
sets of employees performing the same functions [were] subjected on 
the basis of sex to two entirely separate dress codes.”82 Courts 
applying the EQA then seek to determine whether the distinction is a 
monetary or psychological burden. For example, in Carroll, the code 
forced female employees to bear a financial burden and a burden of 
presumed lesser professional status that their male colleagues did not 
have to bear.83 If one sex is more burdened then the other, the court 
deems the regulation to be a violation Title VII.84 
 
 78. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979). Carroll is 
perhaps the second-most-cited case in the field after Willingham, and it is a rare example of 
courts striking down an employer’s policy. 
 79. See In re Nat’l Airlines, Inc. 434 F. Supp. 269, 276 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (upholding weight 
limitations imposed on flight attendants as valid appearance regulations, but engaging in 
thorough consideration of the burdens on each party before doing so); Jarrell v. E. Air Lines, 
430 F. Supp. 884, 893 (E.D. Va. 1977) (same); Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 790 
(D.D.C. 1973) (implying that prohibiting women but not men from wearing eyeglasses was an 
unequal burden). 
 80. Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1029. Men were allowed to wear business attire of their choosing. 
Id. 
 81. Id. at 1030. 
 82. Id. at 1032. 
 83. Id. at 1032–33. Although the uniforms themselves were professional, the fact that 
women alone were required to wear them was demeaning. The natural tendency is to assume 
that uniformed women have a lesser professional status than men allowed to choose their own 
business attire. Id. 
 84. The holding in Carroll was also based on the fact that the uniforms were not grounded 
in commonly accepted social norms, they were not reasonably related to the employer’s 
business needs, and the employer had non-discriminatory alternatives to achieve its business 
purpose. Id. at 1032–33. Other uniform cases have relied on the Carroll rationale. See 
O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266–67 (S.D. Ohio 
1987) (invalidating a requirement that female employees wear smocks); EEOC v. Clayton Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, No. 80-1332C(4), 1981 WL 152, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 1981) (holding that 
a female-only uniform policy is not a “reasonable personal grooming polic[y] imposed in an 
evenhanded manner” and violates Title VII). 
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The EQA rationale appeared in cases throughout the 1980s,85 
and the Ninth Circuit formalized the approach in 2000 when it held 
that sex-differentiated appearance standards that impose unequal 
burdens on men and women violate Title VII, whereas appearance 
standards that impose different but essentially equal burdens on men 
and women do not.86 Proponents of the EQA champion the same 
narrow vision for Title VII as their EFA counterparts, but, unlike the 
EFA, the EQA does not give unfettered discretion to employers. It 
instead focuses on the impact that grooming standards may have on 
employees. The EQA, like both the PSA and the EFA, deals 
explicitly with dress and appearance claims, but the final approach 
draws from the wider area of sex discrimination jurisprudence. 
D. The Reasoning and Evolution of the Price Waterhouse 
Stereotyping Approach 
Under the Price Waterhouse stereotyping approach, sex-
differentiated grooming policies should not be allowed if they 
perpetuate sexual stereotypes about how men and women should 
look. The PWSA draws on the notion of “sexual stereotyping” 
present throughout the first three approaches but is primarily 
associated with the 1989 Supreme Court decision in Price Waterhouse 
 
 85. See, e.g., Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1379–80 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting a 
disparate impact claim because the district court had discretion to find that the plaintiff “was 
discharged because she failed to follow her employer’s instructions, applied evenhandedly to 
males and females, with respect to a legitimate business concern”); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 
766 F.2d 1205, 1205 (8th Cir. 1985) (addressing whether grooming requirements were applied 
evenly to male and female newscasters); Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 
177 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that a woman being told to “tone down” her attire was not disparate 
treatment when men were given grooming cautions as well). Cf. Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F. 
Supp. 894, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (analogizing a judge’s requirement that a lawyer wear a necktie 
in court to the hair cases and holding that “[n]either case rises to the level of enforced 
stereotyping by dress implicated in Carroll”). For more information on the controversial nature 
of Craft, supra, see Patti Buchman, Note, Title VII Limits on Discrimination Against Television 
Anchorwomen on the Basis of Age-Related Appearance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 190 (1985). 
 86. Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854–55 (9th Cir. 2000). Not until 2004 did 
the court begin to formally apply the “unequal burdens test” to traditional grooming and 
appearance regulations. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Casino Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1080 
(9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n Frank we characterized the weight standards at issue as ‘appearance 
standards,’ . . . we have, as yet, had no occasion to apply the ‘unequal burdens’ test to gender-
differentiated dress and grooming requirements.”), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 409 F.3d 
1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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v. Hopkins.87 Price Waterhouse is the only Supreme Court case to 
implicate sex and dress in the private workplace.88 
The facts of Price Waterhouse are as follows: Ann Hopkins was a 
senior manager in the accounting firm of Price Waterhouse and the 
only woman among eighty-eight partnership candidates in 1982.89 
When Price Waterhouse neither accepted nor held over for 
reconsideration Hopkins’ candidacy, she brought suit under Title VII 
alleging that Price Waterhouse had engaged in discrimination 
“because of sex” by “consciously giving credence and effect to 
partners’ comments about her that resulted from sex stereotyping.”90 
In addition to comments made inside the partnership meeting, a 
partner personally advised Hopkins to “walk more femininely, talk 
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry.”91 
The Court held that such comments were evidence that sex had 
been a factor in the decision not to promote Hopkins92 and ruled in 
her favor.93 The PWSA provides an additional reason why Title VII 
should cover grooming and appearance regulation by tying such 
regulations to sexual stereotypes and by identifying sexual 
stereotypes as evidence of sex discrimination. Further, because 
stereotypes are by their nature ingrained, the PWSA offers another 
reason to curtail the amount of discretion given to employers to set 
dress and appearance standards. 
Following the decision in Price Waterhouse, “neither the Justices 
nor the parties seem to have seen the Court as breaking new ground 
on . . . questions of sex stereotyping” or its interaction with 
grooming.94 Despite the fact that it was decided in 1989, grooming 
 
 87. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 88. The Supreme Court has addressed sex and dress in the context of public employees. 
For a discussion of these cases which raise liberty and speech claims, see Klare, supra note 20, at 
1402–11. 
 89. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233. 
 90. Id. at 228. Partners described Ann Hopkins as “aggressive” and “macho” and suggested 
she “overcompensated for being a woman.” Id. at 235. She was advised to take “a course at 
charm school,” and her use of profane language was criticized as unladylike. Id. 
 91. Id. at 235. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 228. 
 94. Case, supra note 18, at 36–37. 
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scholars did not even address the case until well into the mid-1990s.95 
The Court had been condemning what it called “sex stereotyping” 
since the early 1970s,96 and PSA, EFA, and EQA cases contain 
language discussing the relationship between various grooming 
policies and sexual stereotypes.97 Price Waterhouse validated the use 
of this language and broke new ground by expanding the definition of 
a sexual stereotype. Price Waterhouse corroborated the stereotype 
language in earlier cases by emphasizing the legal relevance of 
stereotyping98 and by providing a concrete link between stereotypes 
and grooming, and between grooming and Title VII.99 
Price Waterhouse, however, has been far more controversial for 
the way that it has broadened the definition of a sexual stereotype.100 
Pre–Price Waterhouse stereotyping focused on the “assumption that 
an entire sex [or an individual of that sex] conformed to [a] gender 
stereotype[],”101 and penalized that sex or individual on the basis of 
that assumption.102 By contrast, Price Waterhouse stereotyping 
 
 95. See Bartlett, supra note 20 (failing to mention the case); Klare, supra note 20, at 1421 
n.124 (mentioning the case briefly). Cf. Case, supra note 18, at 36 (calling the case the 
“centerpiece of my discussion”). 
 96. See Case, supra note 18, at 37 (detailing the Court’s long history of condemning sex 
stereotyping). 
 97. See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1213 (8th Cir. 1985) (evaluating the 
argument that the television stations standards discriminated against women by requiring them 
to conform to stereotypes held by viewers); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 
1089 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Willingham’s position is that ‘sex plus’ must be read to intend to include 
‘sex plus any sexual stereotype.’”); Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 665 
(C.D. Cal. 1972) (“Such a dress policy . . . reflects a stereotyped attitude toward one of the 
sexes.”). 
 98. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (“As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we 
are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that 
they matched the stereotype associated with their group.”). 
 99. See id. at 256 (“[I]f an employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ can be corrected by a 
soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not her 
interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.”). Before Price Waterhouse, courts had 
criticized this link. See Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1391–92 (W.D. Mo. 
1979) (holding that the plaintiff’s contention that the no pants rule perpetuates a stereotype and 
“a sexist, chauvinistic attitude in employment” is “simply a matter of opinion”). 
 100. Courts and scholars rarely distinguish between types of stereotyping. See Case, supra 
note 18, at 37 (“Without explicitly acknowledging the fact, the Court, as it was faced with 
increasingly subtle and complex barriers to the equality of the sexes, has gradually broadened its 
conception of impermissible sex stereotyping, lumping together under the same general heading 
several related but conceptually distinguishable phenomena.”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Examples of such stereotyping include rejecting all women as firefighters based on the 
stereotype that women are physically weak, and rejecting an individual woman for a sales 
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penalizes individuals because their gender behavior does not conform 
to stereotypical notions regardless of what gender behavior the job 
requires.103 
Price Waterhouse, for example, discriminated against Ann 
Hopkins because she was uncommonly aggressive for a woman and 
because she did not dress in a feminine manner. The company did so 
even though her position required aggressive behavior and, as the 
success of her male colleagues illustrated, did not require make-up or 
pastel suits. PWSA adherents argue that if Price Waterhouse could 
not discriminate against Ann Hopkins for failing to wear lipstick or 
pastel suits then other employers cannot discriminate against male or 
female employees that fail to look like the employer, or perhaps 
society, think a man or woman should look. Such employees might 
include women who refuse to shave their legs, wear a bra, wear skirts, 
wear makeup, or wear their hair long or styled and men who refuse to 
cut their hair or want to wear jewelry. 
Advocates of the PWSA seek to eradicate all dress and 
appearance regulations based on sexual stereotypes and by doing so 
give employees greater freedom to dress as they wish. PWSA 
proponents do not address an employer’s interest in running its 
business as it sees fit. The language in Price Waterhouse seems tailor-
made for grooming plaintiffs, but no one has ever successfully 
invoked the decision in a traditional grooming case. Most post-1989 
grooming cases are decided based on older rationales and 
approaches.104 
 
position on the assumption that because she is female she is not aggressive, without ever giving 
her an opportunity to show that even if women as a whole are less aggressive then men, she is 
not. 
 103. Case, supra note 18, at 37. An example of such stereotyping is refusing to hire a man 
who appears abnormally sensitive and nurturing, regardless of fact that the job for which he is 
applying requires such characteristics. 
 104. See, e.g., Wiseley v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., No. 03-1540, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14963, 
*16–17 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2004) (refusing to analogize to Price Waterhouse because Harrah’s 
haircut regulation did not target a specific individual in a protected class or deny employment 
opportunity based on class status); Boyce v. Gen. Ry. Signal Co., No. 99-CV-6225T, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13709, at *9 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. June 10, 2004) (restricting Price Waterhouse to 
situations in which the employer has mixed legitimate and illegitimate motives and noting that 
the plaintiff had produced no evidence that the employer’s actions were motivated by a desire 
to deny employment to men). See also supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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II.  THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY: LEARNING FROM EACH 
FAILED APPROACH 
Part I chronicled the development of the four existing 
approaches to sex and grooming. These approaches articulate three 
different goals for Title VII: getting rid of all sex based distinctions in 
the workplace, eliminating only those distinctions that inhibit equal 
employment opportunity, and eradicating distinctions based on post–
Price Waterhouse sexual stereotypes. They emphasize multiple 
combinations of interests from almost entirely pro-employee to 
extremely pro-employer. They range from doctrinally clear to legally 
attenuated, and contain elements that are workable alongside 
elements that are impracticable. No approach is considered “the 
right” one. Part II examines the successes and failure of each 
approach. 
A. Learning from the Per Se Approach 
The PSA is doctrinally clear but overly aspirational and 
practically inapplicable because it fails to recognize and reasonably 
accommodate employer interests and underestimates the negative 
results of a genderless workplace. The PSA is doctrinally clear 
because it adopts a plain meaning of the words “because of sex” in 
Title VII105 and offers a logical analysis of the holdings in the sex-plus 
cases.106 The PSA also offers a clear bright-line rule and avoids the 
myriad problems associated with drawing a line between distinctions 
which are tolerable and those which are not, including determining 
who draws the line, how it is drawn, if the standard is objective or 
subjective, and so on. Bright-line rules may reduce costly, time-
 
 105. Under the PSA, “because of sex” is understood as “but for sex.” For example, 
Donahue would have been able to wear his hair long but for being male. Donahue v. Shoe 
Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1972). Scholars disagree as to what the plain language 
of Title VII requires. For a discussion favoring a per se interpretation in which violators of sex-
specific grooming codes are “clearly protected by . . . the plain language of Title VII,” see Case, 
supra note 18, at 7. Cf. Yuracko, supra note 16, at 170–71 (declaring that the text of Title VII is 
“too sparse and indeterminate” to determine what sex-specific discrimination is actionable). 
 106. Unlike advocates of the EFA, advocates of the PSA do not have to limit their 
interpretations of the holdings in Phillips and Sprogis to stereotypes that affect fundamental 
rights. Compare supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text, with supra notes 67–69 and 
accompanying text.  
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consuming litigation and make it easier to draft employment policies 
that will keep employers and employees out of court.107 
The PSA is aspirational because it requires employers to justify 
every distinction based on sex, including arguably harmless 
distinctions such as separate male and female locker rooms. It is 
impractical because it requires a large shift in the status quo and does 
not allow society to accommodate any sexual or gender norms.108 
“The laws outlawing sex discrimination are important . . . . They must 
be realistically interpreted, or they will be ignored or displaced.”109 
Society continually accepts subtle changes in sex and gender norms, 
but it fears drastic changes, such as the complete elimination of all sex 
and gender norms, and it is likely to reject any approach that requires 
such a change. 
The PSA fails to recognize or accommodate an employer’s true 
interest in the appearance of its employees. Employers care about 
employee dress because employees are a business’s public face. 
Customers form opinions about the employer on the basis of the 
behavior and dress of the employee. Employers want employees to 
display the behavior and dress that customers most prefer. The only 
mechanism within the PSA that addresses the interest of the 
employer is the BFOQ, which cannot accommodate concerns about 
customer preference.110 For example, an employer may require his 
female employees to wear a bra. Such a regulation is based on the sex 
norm that the breasts of women typically are more prone to 
movement, which may be distracting, than those of men. Although 
the employer’s clients may prefer dealing with a female salesperson 
wearing a bra, the employer cannot justify bra wearing as an essential 
qualification in sales. 
The PSA also fails to recognize the consequences to employees 
of creating a workplace without discretionary distinctions based on 
gender norms. When an employer cannot justify distinctions between 
its male and female dress policies, it is faced with two difficult 
 
 107. Bright-line rules can also increase litigation costs. If every distinction is per se 
discrimination it will be very easy for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 
An employer will rarely succeed in a motion to dismiss and will likely only succeed at summary 
judgment by asserting an iron clad BFOQ defense. 
 108. A sex norm is biological, such as the fact that “men can grow beards and women 
typically cannot,” whereas a gender norm is socialized, such as the fact “that women wear 
dresses in this society and men typically do not.” Case, supra note 18, at 10–11. 
 109. Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 110. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
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options. An employer may expand the grooming or clothing options 
available to both sexes, for instance by allowing both male and female 
employees to wear dresses, appear in makeup, and grow facial hair; or 
an employer may narrow the options available to all employees and 
create a universal, androgynous appearance code, for instance by 
requiring all employees to wear slacks, flat shoes, and no makeup.111 
The first option favors gender benders and many scholars praise it as 
a means of elevating the traditionally feminine in society,112 but 
contemporary employers are unlikely to choose it because it makes 
them uncomfortable or they fear it will drive away clients or 
customers.113 
The second option would result in an outcome that is optimal for 
no one and could actually be harmful to women.114 “[T]here is in fact 
no dress, grooming, or trait requirement that does not burden 
individuals of one sex more than the other,” and an androgynous 
dress code allows fewer options “for men to gender bend [and] fewer 
traditionally gender-conforming options for women.”115 Further, same 
does not always mean equal, and requiring sameness may denigrate 
female identity or eliminate forms of dress which have been 
empowering to women. Consider the case of Cadet Sharon Faulkner, 
who fought to be admitted to The Citadel without the traditional 
knob haircut.116 Although a buzz cut on a man connotes masculinity, a 
buzz cut on a woman may signify social and sexual deviance.117 
Faulkner’s situation compares to that of a professional woman forced 
by the strictures of her employer to wear a man’s pinstriped suit and a 
tie.118 Policies attempting to be neutral may actually make it more 
difficult to obtain equal opportunities in the workplace. Further, 
although many scholars argue that female dress codes are patriarchal 
 
 111. See Yuracko, supra note 16, at 202 (identifying these options); see also Case, supra note 
18, at 63 n.214 (discussing the concerns of an androgynous grooming code). 
 112. See Case, supra note 18, at 68 (“[O]ne of the most effective ways to improve the value 
of something coded feminine . . . is to make it accessible to and acceptable in men.”). 
 113. Id. at 7–8. 
 114. Yuracko, supra note 16, at 203. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. at 199–201 (describing Sharon Faulkner’s case). 
 117. Id. at 200. Faulkner’s advocates argued that The Citadel “was proceeding ‘under the 
guise of gender neutral grooming policies [that] implement rules which altogether denigrate Ms. 
Faulkner’s identity as a woman.’” Id. (alteration in original). 
 118. See Bartlett, supra note 20, at 2552 (arguing that the “imitation man” look may force a 
woman to look silly or sexy). 
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and restrictive, other scholars tout the empowering aspects of female 
dress.119 
B. Learning from the Employer Friendly Approach 
The EFA is practical and acknowledges the true interests of 
employers in grooming regulations, but it is doctrinally unclear and 
fails to recognize the interests of employees or quantify the interests 
of employers. The approach is doctrinally unclear because it cannot 
successfully reconcile the sex-plus holdings. The argument that 
Congress only intended Title VII to cover immutable characteristics 
is inconsistent with the statute’s prohibition of religious 
discrimination, and the argument that Congress also intended Title 
VII to protect fundamental rights seems like an exercise in 
constitutional rather than statutory interpretation. The EFA is 
practical because it does not seek to eliminate all distinctions between 
men and women in the workplace and focuses on the core goal of 
Title VII: promoting equal employment opportunity. The EFA fails, 
however, in the way that it determines which distinctions interfere 
with equal employment opportunity. 
The EFA is underinclusive and fails to recognize all the interests 
of employees because courts applying the EFA incorrectly assume 
that only distinctions on the basis of immutable traits and 
fundamental rights affect equal employment opportunity120 and that 
all other distinctions have a negligible impact.121 In reality, other 
distinctions may affect equal employment opportunity if they place a 
greater burden on one sex than another or disproportionately require 
members of one sex to do something contrary to their sense of self.122 
 
 119. See, e.g., id. at 2548–56. 
 120. See Post, supra note 18, at 34 (“Willingham justifies . . . [its approach] on the grounds 
that only [immutable characteristics and fundamental rights] are important enough to interfere 
with the ‘equal employment opportunity’ that is said to be the essential purpose of Title VII. 
But this justification is plainly misconceived.”). Post offers the example of being forced to live 
within three miles of the workplace. Id. Such an indisputable example is much more difficult to 
find in the grooming context because whether or not the requirement is a burden on the 
employee is a more subjective inquiry. Whereas everyone agrees that being restricted in where 
to live is a burden, minds differ as to whether being forced to dress like the majority is. 
 121. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 169 (1961) (“[I]n contrast with morals, the 
rules of . . . dress . . . occupy a relatively low place in the scale of serious importance. They may 
be tiresome to follow, but they do not demand great sacrifice.”), quoted in Bartlett, supra note 
20, at 6 n.74. 
 122. Bayer, supra note 18, at 839–45 (stating that “Title VII is concerned with more than 
merely traditional discrimination” based on mutability and is also concerned with the way in 
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These effects are not negligible. It is inconsistent to assume that 
dress and appearance are trivial to employees while simultaneously 
reinforcing their importance to an employers’ business.123 If people 
care about appearances when they are customers and clients, it is 
likely that they care about them when they are employees. 
Insignificance cannot be assumed; “whether dress and appearance 
standards are trivial or significant depends upon the relationship 
between the standard and the culture in which it is imposed.”124 
Forcing a man to wear a kilt to a formal work function may be 
deemed trivial by a Scottish judge, whereas an American judge may 
deem the same man’s refusal to wear a tuxedo in the United States as 
a significant departure from employer expectations and community 
norms. Moreover, community norms are shifting in nature125—forcing 
a woman to wear a skirt everyday in 1964, at Title VII’s inception, 
might have been trivial, but few women would find it so today.126 
If insignificance is not fixed, someone must define it based on his 
or her own perceptions and norms, and courts are not the appropriate 
parties to do so. The Supreme Court’s holdings indicate that sex has 
no legitimate place in the employment realm unless it is justified as a 
statutory exception or as part of an affirmative action program, and 
that it is not the job of courts to determine what uses of sex are 
“useful,” “not useful,” “worthwhile,” or “outmoded.”127 If Title VII 
 
which race, sex, and national origin implicate the sense of self”). “[R]ace, color, sex and national 
origin,” as enumerated in Title VII, can be read broadly as examples of things which implicate a 
person’s sense of self rather than as an exclusive list of prohibitions. See id. at 839 (“If we 
recognize that individual dignity, personal freedom, and sense of self are often intimately tied to 
mutable characteristics, then we must criticize the cavalier fashion with which courts dismiss 
individuals’ claims that employers’ racially, sexually, or ethnically premised rules unjustly 
restrict personal integrity and expression.”). The mutability of a trait tells one nothing about its 
importance to the sense of self. Id. 
 123. Bartlett, supra note 20, at 2558 (stating that it is ridiculous to “categorically assume[] 
that the interests of employees will always be less weighty than those of the employer”); see also 
Klare, supra note 20, at 1419 (“[T]hat productive efficiency requires deference to managerial 
discretion . . . is casually stated as a premise, with little effort being made in the cases to 
persuade that it is actually true.”). 
 124. Bartlett, supra note 20, at 2559. 
 125. Id. at 2569 (noting that community norms are “interactional or relational” and that 
Title VII is about “steering and steadying a moving target” rather than determining a fixed, 
permanent meaning). 
 126. See Case, supra note 18, at 66 n.224 (describing a California law that prohibits this 
practice). 
 127. See Bayer, supra note 18, at 856 (relying on Los Angeles Department of Water and 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), and Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 
(1983), to demonstrate the inappropriateness of courts categorizing stereotypes). 
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did not intend for courts to make such determinations, it likely did 
not intend them to be able to discard certain instances of sex 
discrimination as insignificant, as courts applying the EFA have 
done.128 
The EFA is overinclusive because it fails to quantify employer 
interests and balance employee interests. Courts applying the EFA 
allow employers to implement distinctions between employees 
regardless of how little or how much employers need those 
distinctions for their business. Under the EFA, employers are allowed 
to condemn all employees who violate “established gender grooming 
and dress conventions” even when their violations do not negatively 
impact the employers.129 Judges view employees who refuse to change 
mutable characteristics at their employer’s request and who 
“willful[ly] deviat[e] from customary norms of gender appearance” as 
social deviants.130 As a result, judges applying the EFA allow 
employers to regulate appearance in any way they choose “so long as 
[their] judgment represents an effort to satisfy [their version of] 
community norms.”131 For example, an employer could prohibit male 
employees from wearing earrings even if the majority of the 
employer’s customers and clients were ambivalent about male 
earrings. 
C. Learning from the Equity Approach 
The EQA, unlike its predecessors, acknowledges the significance 
of grooming and appearance standards to both employers and 
employees. Like the EFA, the EQA is practical and limits its reach to 
outlawing distinctions that create unequal employment opportunities. 
Nevertheless, the EQA fails because it is difficult to apply objectively. 
The approach can also be criticized for allowing employers 
unnecessary latitude to impose sexist polices on both sexes and for 
relying too heavily on cultural norms. 
The EQA acknowledges the true significance of grooming to 
employers by allowing them to impose codes that incorporate 
customer preferences based on gender and sex norms. A grooming 
code is permissible if “both sexes are being screened with respect to a 
 
 128. See, e.g., supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 129. Post, supra note 18, at 34. 
 130. Id. at 35. 
 131. Bartlett, supra note 20, at 2557 (emphasis added). 
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neutral fact, i.e., grooming in accordance with generally accepted 
community standards of dress and appearance.”132 The EQA also 
recognizes the extent of employee interests, and therefore 
acknowledges that polices that do not implicate fundamental rights or 
immutable traits, such as the uniform policy in Carroll, may still 
impose financial or psychological burdens on employees and affect 
equal employment opportunities. 
The EQA is difficult for courts to apply because it requires 
plaintiffs to identify and prove a burden objectively. Outside of not 
getting hired, fired, or promoted, every person may have his or her 
own idea of what constitutes a burden. Carroll seems to indicate that 
burdens may be financial, like the cost of cleaning a uniform, or 
psychological, like the feeling of being considered less professional 
than one’s opposite sex colleagues,133 but people can consider other 
things like time and inconvenience to be burdens as well. 
Psychological feelings such as inferiority and unquantifiable notions 
like inconvenience vary by person. If courts applying the EQA allow 
plaintiffs to subjectively define their burdens and take their individual 
preferences into account, they may create lengthy, fact-intensive 
litigation that makes it more difficult for employers to foresee which 
policies may create problems and to craft workable solutions. An 
individual plaintiff’s 
objection to [a grooming requirement], without more, [cannot] give 
rise to a claim . . . under Title VII. If we were to [allow such a claim], 
we would come perilously close to holding that every grooming, 
apparel, or appearance requirement that an individual finds 
personally offensive, or in conflict with his or her own self-image, 
can create a triable issue of sex discrimination.134 
On the other hand, if courts decide based on an objective “reasonable 
person” standard they may underestimate burdens as a whole and 
isolate nonconformists in cases in which grooming is inextricably 
entwined with notions of sexual orientation and gender conformity.135 
It is also difficult for plaintiffs and courts to equate a male 
burden with a female burden without resorting to arbitrary 
 
 132. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 133. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1030, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 134. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 135. See Klare, supra note 20, at 1420 (noting that a “community standard” discriminates 
against non-conformers who “reject or mock dominant expectations”). 
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nominalism.136 For instance, how does one determine if men and 
women are subject to equal burdens when men are required to 
remain clean shaven? Although women may have facial hair, a 
woman’s facial hair is biologically different from a man’s. A male 
plaintiff protesting the shaving requirement may try to name his 
burden as having to shave his face and point out that women do not 
have this burden. A defending employer may name the burden as 
maintaining a well-groomed face and point to female burdens such as 
applying makeup, waxing brows or lips, and controlling blemishes. 
The outcome may turn completely on this arbitrary naming game.137 
With nonbiological traits the game may become even more difficult as 
policies force plaintiffs and courts to evaluate distinctly imposed 
sexual meanings. Assume for instance that an employer prohibits 
clothing that exudes sexuality. “[T]here is no consensus on exactly 
what kind of dress is provocative,” and employers likely base their 
workplace policies on their subjective belief about what should be 
impermissible.138 Even if the employer, the employee, and the court 
can agree on what should be disallowed for one sex, for instance low 
cut blouses or tight skirts on women, they cannot frame the cross-sex 
equivalent.139 If men are generally not considered sexy in tight skirts 
and low-cut blouses, what clothing choices can an employer prohibit 
so as to impose a burden on them as well? 
One can also criticize the EQA for giving employers latitude to 
impose sexist policies on both sexes as long as the policies are equally 
sexist. For example, under the EQA an employer could not require 
its female employees to meet stricter weight requirements than male 
employees. The employer likewise could not require male employees 
 
 136. Yuracko, supra note 16, at 188 (noting that “[i]n a gendered society, women and men 
simply cannot possess the same trait in precisely the same way” and thus the equal burdens 
approach becomes a “nominalism game whose outcome depends on how one names the trait at 
issue and frames the cross-sex comparison”). 
 137. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Harrah’s 
contends that the burden of the makeup requirement must be evaluated with reference to all of 
the requirements of the policy, including those that burden men only, such as the requirement 
that men maintain short haircuts and neatly trimmed nails. Jespersen contends that the only 
meaningful appearance standard against which the makeup requirement can be measured is the 
corresponding ‘no makeup’ requirement for men. We agree with Harrah’s approach.”), vacated 
and reh’g en banc granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 138. Klare, supra note 20, at 1399–1400. 
 139. See Yuracko, supra note 16, at 192 (discussing the problem of prohibitions against sexy 
dress). 
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to meet stricter body fat percentage and muscle definition 
requirements than female employees. The employer could, however, 
require male employees to comply with the second policy and female 
employees to comply with the first if the employer could show that 
the burden of complying with each policy was the same. 
One can further criticize the EQA because it allows employers to 
defer completely to culturally accepted gender norms. Culturally 
accepted gender norms may themselves be subjective and 
discriminatory and may intrinsically impose unequal burdens.140 Many 
people view community norms as sexist and patriarchal,141 and feel 
that the burden of conforming to them falls more harshly on women 
then on men. For example, community norms often judge women 
more harshly on appearance142 and weight.143 Proponents of this view 
often reference the case of Christine Craft. Craft was a news-anchor 
in the 1980s and her station required her to follow a “clothing 
calendar” and to undergo extensive consulting before ultimately 
demoting her from co-anchor to reporter because she failed to meet 
the public’s ideal of a “professional anchor woman.”144 The station’s 
dress code applied to men and women, but the community’s view of 
professionalism caused it to fall more harshly on women.145 
D. Learning from the Price Waterhouse Stereotyping Approach 
The PWSA successfully recognizes that stereotypes can burden 
employees and restrict equal employment opportunity. The approach 
 
 140. See Bartlett, supra note 20, at 2568 (“[C]ommunity norms [do not] operate[] as 
objective, neutral principles on which to base the legal definition of equality . . . .”). 
 141. For example, the notion of women in skirts may be based on an understanding “that 
[women] are better suited for less active or assertive roles” and that they “should enhance their 
allure as sex objects.” Klare, supra note 20, at 1419. 
 142. See Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1378 (7th Cir. 1987) (illustrating the 
plaintiff’s concern that her employer’s understanding of professional dress fell more harshly on 
women); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1214 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[V]iewers—
particularly other women—criticize women more severely than men for their appearance on 
camera and . . . women’s dress is more complex and demanding because ‘society has made it 
that way.’”); Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Mr. 
Marcovsky felt that her clothes were . . . not in keeping with the department’s policy of dressing 
in a conservative style.” (emphasis added)). 
 143. Bartlett, supra note 20, at 2562–63 (discussing the flight attendant weight cases). 
 144. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1209. 
 145. Id. (“[A] telephone survey of some 400 randomly selected persons . . . . asked to rank 
Craft in comparison with the female coanchors at KMBC’s competitors . . . [on] the dress of and 
image of a ‘professional anchor woman’ . . . suggested that Craft was having an extremely 
adverse impact on KMBC’s acceptance among Kansas City viewers.”). 
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also begins to quantify employee interest in grooming and 
appearance. The PWSA falls short, however, because it is overly 
broad, doctrinally unclear, and does not recognize an employer’s 
interests in grooming and appearance. 
The PWSA provides a fuller picture of the motive behind 
sexually disparate grooming codes. The codes are not the product of 
malicious intent, like many other forms of sex discrimination. They 
are the unintentional byproduct of culturally ingrained ideas about 
the sexes. Proponents of the PWSA recognize and affirm that these 
ideas can give rise to unequal employment opportunities just like 
more blatant forms of sex discrimination and must be closely 
monitored. The PWSA quantifies the employee’s interest by looking 
not only at the burden of the rule on the employee subjectively, but 
also at the objective burden on the employee’s ability to perform his 
or her job. Wearing feminine clothing was a burden on Ann Hopkins 
personally and it restrained her ability to perform at work by 
curtailing her ability to be professionally aggressive. 
The PWSA is overly broad because it has the effect of judicially 
extending Title VII protection to discrimination against gays, 
lesbians, transgendered individuals, and other sexual minorities 
contrary to the will of Congress.146 Plaintiffs have rarely invoked the 
PWSA in traditional grooming litigation. The approach has been far 
more successful in protecting gender nonconformists from sexual 
harassment147 and has been marginally successful in extending 
employment protections to cross-dressers diagnosed with Gender 
Identity Disorder (GID). Smith v. City of Salem148 is a recent example 
of such a success.149 There the Sixth Circuit held that Title VII 
 
 146. For a list of multiple failed attempts to create federal protection for sexual orientation, 
see Sunish Gulati, Note, The Use of Gender-Loaded Identities in Sex-Stereotyping Jurisprudence, 
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2177, 2196 n.87 (2003). 
 147. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001) (successfully 
utilizing PWSA in a Title VII action against an employer for harassment based on sex 
stereotypes); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(analyzing PWSA in an action against an employer for retaliation and discrimination). See 
generally Geoffrey S. Trotier, Dude Looks Like a Lady: Protection Based on Gender 
Stereotyping Discrimination as Developed in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, 20 LAW 
& INEQ. 237 (2002) (asserting that gender roles are no longer separated into a male/female 
dichotomy). 
 148. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 149. See id. at 575 (“[D]iscrimination against a plaintiff who is a transsexual—and therefore 
fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender—is no different from the discrimination 
directed against Ann Hopkins.”). 
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prohibited adverse employment action against a male, transsexual 
firefighter diagnosed with GID. The fire department could not 
discriminate against the man for exhibiting a more feminine 
appearance at work because the holding in Price Waterhouse protects 
employees who fail to act or identify with their gender.150 Plaintiffs 
like Smith rely on the Supreme Court’s interchangeable use of the 
words “gender” and “sex” in Price Waterhouse151 and the considerable 
overlap between gender nonconformity and sexual orientation.152 
The PWSA is doctrinally vague because it extends protection to 
stereotypes that do not create unequal employment opportunity. The 
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse was concerned about the 
partners forcing Ann Hopkins to comply with feminine stereotypes 
because such compliance would hinder her ability to be successful in 
her job. Hopkins was caught in a double bind: her employer required 
that she comply with feminine stereotypes and be professionally 
successful in order to make partner, but she could not achieve one 
without giving up the other. The PWSA goes beyond the actual 
holding of Price Waterhouse and prohibits employers from requiring 
any stereotypical behavior from their employees. To illustrate, under 
a true reading of Price Waterhouse, a nursery school could not require 
its male teachers to be brusque and aggressive when successful 
nursery school teachers are kind and nurturing, but it could require its 
janitors to behave in a stereotypically masculine manner because 
displaying feminine characteristics is not essential to success on a 
cleaning crew. Inconsistent with Price Waterhouse, the PWSA 
assumes that an employer could not do the latter. 
The PWSA fails in the same way as the PSA with regard to 
recognizing an employer’s interest in the grooming and appearance of 
its employees. Prohibiting an employer from forcing its employees to 
comply with gender stereotypes is equivalent to prohibiting an 
employer from forcing its employees to comply with community 
norms. Something is a stereotype because it is commonly thought to 
be the norm. Both approaches fail to recognize that employers have 
an interest in pleasing their customers and clients, which often means 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Case, supra note 18, at 10 (identifying the consequences of “sex” and “gender” 
being used interchangeably in the law). 
 152. See Gulati, supra note 146, at 2199 (discussing how courts often confuse gender and 
sexual orientation). 
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presenting an image through its employees that makes its customers 
and clients comfortable. 
III.  APPLYING THE LESSONS OF YESTERDAY TO CREATE A  
NEW APPROACH 
A present-day plaintiff bringing a sexually disparate grooming 
case inherits thirty-five years of grooming litigation relying on four 
distinct legal approaches. Some of this so-called grooming litigation 
really implicates other issues entirely, such as 1970s long hair as a 
challenge to authority or the lack of legislation to protect sexual 
minorities from discrimination and harassment. The remaining 
grooming cases fail to reconcile the different goals and emphases of 
the four approaches or fail to recognize that there are distinct 
approaches at all, and courts pick and choose language and holdings 
to fit their purposes. The result for a modern-day plaintiff is a 
decision, often favoring the defendant, which seems more like a 
cobbling together of cases than a well-reasoned exercise in justice. 
Jespersen provides an excellent example of such a jumbled 
opinion. It incorporated and intermingled cases from several time 
periods and approaches and referenced a line of sexual minority cases 
that have nothing to do with grooming at all. There, the court relied 
on numerous haircut cases decided under the EFA for the 
proposition that employers may differentiate among male and female 
employees with respect to grooming,153 while also analyzing a makeup 
policy under the EQA. It cited an out-of-circuit EFA/EQA case for 
the proposition that a grooming policy must be reviewed holistically 
rather than piecemeal,154 while ignoring PSA and EQA cases decided 
inside and outside the Ninth Circuit that imply the opposite.155 
 
 153. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 154. Id. at 1112 (“Defendant’s hair length requirement for male employees is part of a 
comprehensive personal grooming code applicable to all employees.” (citing Knott v. Mo. Pac. 
R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975))). 
 155. See Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 665 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (“This 
court holds, therefore, that an employee dress and grooming code, whether written or 
unwritten, wherein the allowable length of hair is different for male and female employees is 
discrimination on the basis of sex within the meaning of Section 703(a) of the Act.”); see also 
O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266–67 (S.D. Ohio 
1987) (striking down a smock requirement that was part of a dress code for male and female 
employees); Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 790 (D.D.C. 1973) (evaluating 
policies such as eyeglasses, height, and weight individually), overruled on other grounds, 567 
F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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The court distinguished Harrah’s makeup policy from a weight 
policy that it had previously struck down because the enforcer of the 
latter policy admitted that its goal was to compete by having its 
customers served by attractive women.156 Yet, the court never seemed 
to consider that the admission was made in 1982, a time when 
employers likely felt they could be more explicit about such business 
strategies. Nor did the court really ask why Harrah’s needed its 
female employees to wear make-up. The court rejected Darlene 
Jespersen’s sexual stereotyping argument by distinguishing her 
situation from that of Ann Hopkins, and yet it still felt compelled to 
distinguish a line of cases in which sexual minorities successfully 
alleged harassment under a Price Waterhouse sexual stereotyping 
theory.157 The court ultimately held that Darlene Jespersen had failed 
to present evidence that Harrah’s policies placed an unequal burden 
on women or that Harrah’s designed its policy to perpetuate a sexual 
stereotype. The Jespersen decision leaves its readers scratching their 
heads. What did the Ninth Circuit accomplish by allowing an 
employer to enforce a policy whose true benefits are unclear and that 
requires an exemplary employee to undergo a ritual, wholly unrelated 
to her core job functions, which many American women find to be 
stereotypical, antiquated, and unnecessary? 
To avoid future head-scratching, courts and scholars must pick 
among the possible goals articulated in existing approaches. They 
must clearly identify and quantify all of the interests involved in order 
to properly balance them. Any resulting approach should also seek to 
be doctrinally clear, practically applicable, and based on precedent 
that truly addresses grooming and appearance. The Part II analysis of 
the four existing approaches reveals that the most workable future 
approach will be one that (1) adopts the goal of equal employment 
opportunity; (2) recognizes that employees have a special interest in 
their grooming and appearance that they do not have in other terms 
and conditions of employment, but does not seek to quantify this 
interest on an employee-by-employee basis; (3) understands that 
employee appearance may severely impact the success of an 
employer’s business but puts the burden on the employer to prove the 
degree of this impact; (4) provides a mechanism for balancing the 
 
 156. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109 (discussing the weight policy for female stewardesses that 
the Ninth Circuit declared impermissible in Gerdom v. Cont’l Airline, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th 
Cir. 1982)). 
 157. Id. at 1112–13. 
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degree of objective interest on the part of the employee with the 
degree of impact on the employer; and (5) places the sexual minority 
and haircut lines of cases in the appropriate perspective. 
A. One Goal and a Mechanism for Achieving It 
Equal employment opportunity is the core of Title VII and must 
be the goal of any new approach to grooming and appearance. The 
PSA failed to gain judicial acceptance because it was premised on an 
unreasonable goal—the elimination of every grooming distinction 
between men and women in the workplace. It made no room to 
consider customers’ preference for employees that dress according to 
sex and gender norms,158 nor did it consider any of the negative results 
of removing norms completely from the workplace.159 Further, judges 
are people too, and they are no more capable of enforcing a world 
without gender distinctions than employers and their customers are 
capable of envisioning one.160 The PWSA continues to fail because it 
has lost sight of the goal of the decision on which it was based. The 
Supreme Court rejected the stereotypes that Price Waterhouse forced 
onto Ann Hopkins because they limited her ability to do her job. 
Price Waterhouse rejected stereotypes that create unequal 
employment opportunity. Eliminating all sexual stereotypes, like 
eliminating all stereotypes, if possible, is a goal for another day and 
another law. 
Any future approach must recognize that employees have a 
special interest in their grooming and appearance that they do not 
have in other terms and conditions of employment. This interest goes 
beyond the mutability and fundamental rights concerns of the EFA 
and is present regardless of the burdens placed on each sex. 
Grooming and appearance are the ways that each individual signals to 
the world his or her feelings and associations. Clothing or grooming 
practices can covey conformity, threat, sexual liberation, objection to 
 
 158. Under the PSA every distinction must be justified as a BFOQ, and customer 
preference is not a valid BFOQ. See supra Part I.A. 
 159. See supra Part II.A. 
 160. This argument could also be made about the ability to envision a race-blind world 
following the passage of Title VII or a world in which women were not summarily excluded 
from certain job categories. However, although there is no reason to distinguish between a black 
man and a white man in terms of employment or a man and a woman in terms of capability, 
there are nondiscriminatory reasons to distinguish in terms of dress, including the biological 
differences in male and female bodies. 
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authority, or an association with a particular group or subculture. 
Because grooming and appearance practices are connected to an 
employee’s sense of self rather than merely to his or her identity as a 
worker, they are important to an employee in a way that other terms 
and conditions of employment, like a better office or more vacation, 
are not. The problems with the EQA illustrate that these subjective 
interests are difficult to quantify in litigation. They are even more 
difficult for an employer to understand when it is hiring or setting 
employment policies that apply to everyone. Any future approach 
must recognize the subjective interests of employees but have an 
objective means of quantifying them. 
One objective measure to begin with may be whether the 
grooming or appearance regulation of the employer restrains the 
employees’ abilities to express themselves outside the workplace as 
well as within the workplace. Under this rule a regulation restricting 
hair length would be impermissible because employees cannot adjust 
the natural length of their hair by leaving the workplace. By contrast, 
a regulation requiring men and women to wear different uniforms at 
work would be permissible. This rule might prove inept against 
regulations like makeup, which theoretically can be removed or 
applied but which could create skin problems or conditions that might 
afflict an employee at home and at work. 
Likewise, any new approach must recognize the unique interests 
of employers in a way that the PSA and PWSA do not. An employer 
is concerned with its bottom line, which depends on the opinions of 
clients and customers. Clients and customers are either individuals or 
enterprises made up of individuals. Many of these individuals prefer 
to interact with people who comply with sex and gender norms either 
because of their own sensibilities or because of the sensibilities and 
perceptions of their clients and customers. If the law is going to 
recognize that grooming and appearance are important to employees 
because it allows them to convey messages such as threat or 
nonconformity, the law cannot ignore that when employees convey 
these messages at work they may be speaking for their employers.161 
Cultural norms in the form of customer preference cannot be 
relied on blindly, however. As critiques of the EQA point out, 
 
 161. Post, supra note 18, at 5–6 (“Employers thus quite reasonably objected to the theme of 
self-expression on the grounds that ‘[i]f someone looks and acts as if they don’t care what others 
think, they risk being rejected.’” (quoting Jane Meredith Adams, California City Faces Raging 
Dress Code War, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 16, 1992, at C4)). 
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screening both sexes with regard to cultural norms can be problematic 
when cultural norms are often themselves patriarchal and inherently 
disadvantage women. Any approach that does not examine 
community norms and “attempt[] to identify the cultural meanings 
underlying them and determin[e] to what extent they impose burdens 
that disadvantage members of one sex in relation to the other”162 may 
fail to live up to Title VII’s legacy.163 Cultural norms, however, are 
difficult to define, as they are largely shifting and contextual. In the 
years when pants were transitioning from inappropriate to 
appropriate female workplace dress, there were likely large 
disparities in the cultural norm, differing from region to region and 
industry to industry. As the critique of the EFA emphasizes, it should 
not be left to the unfettered discretion of the employer to determine 
what the cultural norms of its customer base are.164 To the extent that 
the employer’s notions are outdated, neither the employer nor the 
employee will benefit. 
One step in the right direction may be to require employers to 
justify the sex-differentiated grooming codes that employees most 
object to with objective evidence of the cultural norms of their client 
base. Courts have recognized a BFOQ of customer preference in a 
limited number of circumstances.165 Courts could carve out a BFOQ 
for customer preferences based on cultural norms in the limited area 
of dress and appearance claims. The burden of proof would rest with 
the employer. It might prove such norms by survey, and the data 
could be collected by consumer and business interest groups in the 
same way that they collect data about other customer desires. 
Even if a new approach is able to identify and quantify employer 
and employee interests, it must have a practical mechanism for 
balancing such interests in the case of a conflict. A possible 
mechanism might take the shape of the following: An employee 
would contest a sex-differentiated policy by presenting objective 
evidence of a distinction in treatment of male and female employees 
 
 162. Bartlett, supra note 20, at 2569. 
 163. See Whisner, supra note 20, at 84 (“When ‘commonly accepted social norms’ 
disadvantage women, the countenancing of an employment practice that takes its justification 
from those norms defeats the purpose of a statute proscribing sex discrimination.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 164. See supra Part II.B. 
 165. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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based on a gender, not a sex norm,166 and evidence that the distinction 
created unequal employment opportunities. A distinction would be 
assumed to create unequal employment opportunities if it came 
within the rules created to objectively measure employee interest, 
such as if it impacted an employee’s dress and appearance outside of 
the workplace. Employees would also be able to present any evidence 
of subjective harm, provided that they informed the employer of the 
harm at the time it implemented the policy. An employer could 
defeat an employee’s claim by showing that the distinction was not 
based on a gender norm, that it did not impact equal employment 
opportunity, or that the employee had not informed it of the 
subjective harm. An employer could also assert an affirmative 
defense of customer preference in the vein of a BFOQ that the 
employer would have the burden to prove using objective data 
gathered in a manner that meets the court’s evidentiary standards. 
B. The Problematic Legacy of the Haircut Cases and  
Price Waterhouse 
Two groups of cases are frequently connected to the issue of sex 
and dress and often cloud the analysis. The haircut cases address 
claims, primarily from the 1970s, by male employees that their 
employers’ policies of prohibiting men but not women from wearing 
long hair violate Title VII. The sexual minority cases address claims 
by gay, lesbian, or transgendered employees that the holding in Price 
Waterhouse prohibits employers from taking any adverse action 
against them because they are not conforming to stereotypes about 
their sex or gender. Courts must keep the haircut cases in appropriate 
perspective by recognizing that they implicated challenges to 
authority as much, if not more than, they implicated sex in the 
workplace. Meanwhile, courts must understand that although the 
sexual minority cases rely on the stereotyping language in Price 
Waterhouse, they do not primarily implicate grooming and 
appearance. Making this distinction is often difficult because of the 
overlap between grooming and appearance and the expression of 
sexual or gender preference. 
 
 166. Examples of policies based on sex norms might include rules based on modesty and 
indecent exposure statutes, like bathing suit regulations or rules built around the distinct shape 
of male and female bodies, such as a bra requirement for women. 
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Both the PSA and the EFA developed almost exclusively by 
relying on cases addressing male hair length. The outcome of the 
haircut cases established the rule that employers may impose 
different grooming standards on male and female employees.167 
Modern courts continue to rely on this rule and the great number of 
cases articulating it without looking at the analyses or the facts behind 
it. Further, the haircut cases established this rule early in the 
evolution of grooming jurisprudence, and subsequent approaches 
attempted to work within it. As a result, these holdings wield a great 
deal of power. Courts must remember, however, that the plaintiffs in 
these cases were likely as concerned with challenging authority as 
with challenging sexism. For example, the plaintiffs in Aros were 
young, male, college students, in the early days of Title VII. At that 
time challenges were likely to come from African Americans or 
women, and the court ultimately concluded that the students were 
discharged not because of sexual bias but because of “their propensity 
to linger in the halls too often and enter parts of the plant where they 
didn’t belong, and their failure to report back when they had 
completed an assignment.”168 
The opinion spoke less about the relationship between sex and 
workplace appearance and more about the visceral connection 
between long hair and “youth, campus riots, unemployed hippies and 
‘troublemakers.’”169 Plaintiffs challenged hair length on constitutional 
grounds during the same period, and the opinions universally 
discussed the connection between hair length and the expression of 
controversial ideas.170 Courts and scholars must not disregard the 
connection between long hair and social protest when reading the 
outcome of these cases as precedent. Had plaintiffs challenged a 
 
 167. For an example of the lasting impact of the haircut cases, see Jarrell v. Eastern Air 
Lines, 430 F. Supp. 884, 891 (E.D. Va. 1977) (“There is virtual unanimity among the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals that an employer may impose reasonable personal appearance requirements 
upon its employees and such standards need not be identical for males and females. Such 
practices are said to be non-sexually discriminating. The plaintiffs’ efforts to distinguish these 
so-called ‘hair-length’ cases are not persuasive.”). 
 168. Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 667 (C.D. Cal. 1972). 
 169. Id. at 666. The court in Donahue likewise linked “style of dress, hair length, and other 
superficial features” with race, color, and national origin, and proclaimed that the “tendency to 
stereotype people is at the root of some of the social ills that afflict the country.” Donahue v. 
Shoe Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1972). 
 170. See, e.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 621 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (Wisdom, J., 
dissenting) (discussing hair as a personal matter and a fundamental right). For a discussion of 
additional claims, see Klare, supra note 20, at 1402–11. 
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grooming standard that more directly implicated sex early on, like 
rules prohibiting women from wearing pants, early approaches may 
have developed differently. 
Likewise, courts must attempt to separate the issue of grooming 
from the issue of sexual orientation and gender identity and 
understand the sexual minority cases “as primarily implicating sexual 
orientation, more than sex.”171 As discussed previously, the 
stereotyping discussion in Price Waterhouse has been far more 
frequently linked to and far more successful at addressing 
discrimination against sexual minorities than grooming.172 Yet most 
contemporary grooming plaintiffs assert the PWSA because it is both 
more recent and more plaintiff friendly than alternative approaches. 
The association between grooming claims and sexual minorities, 
however, confuses the analysis. Many sitting on the bench are still 
disturbed173 by the notion of male workers “wear[ing] nail polish and 
dresses and speak[ing] in falsetto and minc[ing] about in high heels”174 
or female attorneys with legs unshaved presenting before the court.175 
Judges and the public are not universally accepting of gender 
nonconformists, and many do not view discrimination against such 
individuals in the same way as discrimination on the basis of race, 
biological sex, or national origin.176 Many fear that plaintiffs are trying 
to use the stereotyping language in Price Waterhouse to bootstrap 
sexual orientation and gender nonconformity protection into Title 
VII177 contrary to the express intent of Congress,178 and are 
 
 171. Carbado et al., supra note 7, at 136. This is admittedly difficult to do as individuals 
frequently express their gender identity or signal their sexual orientation through their 
appearance, and grooming serves as a gender identifier to other individuals and to society as a 
whole. Children from a young age identify people’s sex based on their outward appearance 
rather than their biological makeup. 
 172. See supra Part I.D. 
 173. Fears about the man in a dress have been present since the 1970s. See supra note 60. 
 174. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1067 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 175. During oral arguments in Jespersen, a Ninth Circuit judge asked, “Can a law firm fire a 
female associate for failing to shave her legs?” Carbado et al., supra note 7, at 127. 
 176. For a discussion of the issues that surround the transgendered, see generally 
Transgender Law & Policy Institute, http://www.transgenderlaw.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2006). 
 177. See Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 246 F. Supp. 2d 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(addressing a female hairstylist who claimed she was not promoted because she was perceived 
as butch). “[W]hat Dawson’s theory seeks to do is to ‘bootstrap protection for sexual 
orientation into Title VII . . .’ under the guise of sexual stereotyping.” Id. at 315 (quoting 
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 178. See Case, supra note 18, at 64 (noting that Congress in the ADA explicitly excludes 
from the protection of the Act “virtually every conceivable form of a man in a dress—whether 
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immediately suspicious when plaintiffs rely on it. Using “Price 
Waterhouse” and “grooming” in the same sentence immediately 
conjures up the “specter of the man in dress,”179 which creates 
problems for a more traditional grooming use of the PWSA. 
The sexual minority cases are an outgrowth of the absence of a 
federal legal framework to protect sexual minorities. Title VII does 
not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination or discrimination 
against the transgendered, yet these individuals are often subject to 
incredibly hostile work environments. Judges and legal scholars are 
not immune to the horrible facts of these cases. In making the 
connection between the “sexual stereotyping” language in Price 
Waterhouse and the atypical gender and sexual behavior of many 
sexual minorities, courts were likely looking for a way to provide 
redress in the face of Congress’s refusal to do so.180 The subset of gays 
and lesbians most likely to be subjected to physical harm or severe 
verbal harassment are those whose behavior or appearance are 
contrary to what society expects of their sex. The sexual orientation 
of those conforming to society’s expectations is less likely to be 
known, and other employees are less likely to feel threatened by or 
uncomfortable around someone whom they perceive to be acting 
“normally.” 
A theory like Price Waterhouse and the PWSA based on gender 
nonconformity serves the goal of protecting those gays and lesbians 
most in need of protection without extending protection to sexual 
orientation as a whole and overtly flouting the wishes of Congress. 
Perhaps this is the reason that so many judges have been willing to 
use it in the area of same-sex sexual harassment even though they 
have failed to use it in traditional grooming cases. Grooming scholars 
and courts addressing grooming claims should read the sexual 
minority cases with this context in mind and should divorce this use of 
Price Waterhouse from what the case may have to say about 
traditional grooming claimants. After all, Ann Hopkins was a 
 
transvestite, transsexual, suffering from gender-identity disorder, or homosexual”); Gulati, 
supra note 146, at 2196 n.87 (listing all the Congressional attempts to pass a law protecting 
sexual orientation). 
 179. Case, supra note 18, at 8. 
 180. Carbado, et al., supra note 7, at 136–37. Such judicial activism could be seen as 
analogous to the Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans, 516 U.S. 620 (1996), to use a new 
heightened rational basis review to assess under Equal Protection a law implicating gay rights. 
Id. at 137. 
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heterosexual woman and did not dress in a manner so far removed 
from the mainstream. 
CONCLUSION 
When one examines sex and grooming precedent from 1964 to 
2006 chronologically and as distinct from other areas of sex 
discrimination, several lessons emerge. Four approaches to grooming 
and appearance exist, each with a distinct analysis. These approaches 
articulate three insular goals for Title VII with respect to grooming, 
and each approach emphasizes and balances the interests of 
employees and employers differently. None of these existing 
approaches are without flaws. When they are intermingled they 
create a jurisprudence that is unclear and that results in courts 
upholding employer policies regardless of how offensive they are to 
employees or how necessary they are to employers. Grooming and 
appearance jurisprudence becomes even more confusing when 
scholars and courts fail to recognize the true context of the haircut 
and sexual minority cases. Courts and scholars must adopt a new 
approach, using the mistakes of the past as a blueprint for the future. 
In doing so they may create a new legal framework that recognizes 
the unique interests of employees and employers in grooming and 
appearance, and that only allows sex-based grooming and appearance 
requirements to impede equal employment opportunity to the extent 
necessary for enterprises to succeed. 
